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Abstract. Does ethnic stacking in the armed forces help prevent military defection? 
Recent research, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, suggests so: by favoring in-
groups, regimes can keep in-group soldiers loyal. In-group loyalty comes at the cost of 
antagonizing members of out-groups, but many regimes gladly run that risk. In this 
research note, we provide new large-scale evidence of the impact of ethnic stacking on 
the incidence of military defection during uprisings from below. Using data on fifty-
seven popular uprisings in Africa since formal independence, we find clear support for 
the downsides of ethnic stacking: the practice is associated with more frequent defections 
if out-group members are still dominant in the armed forces. We find more limited 
support for the hypothesized payoff. Ethnic stacking may reduce the risk of defection, but 
only in regimes without a recent history of coup attempts. Future research should 




During the Arab Spring, ruling regimes in Bahrain and Syria successfully avoided 
the wholesale change in military loyalties that took place in Egypt. As elsewhere in the 
world, military defections helped to decide the outcomes of these uprisings: weak 
uprisings can overcome strong regimes when security forces hold their fire or switch 
sides (Chorley 1943; Russell 1974; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Barany 2016). Bahrain 
and Syria may have taken a different course from Egypt because of the domination of 
sectarian minorities in the armed forces (Nepstad 2013; Makara 2013). Ethnic stacking, 
in theory, gives members of a preferred ethnic category a clear stake in the regime’s 
continued survival that outweighs whatever benefits an opposition group can credibly 
offer. These officers may fear that, even if they defect, they and their friends and family 
will be associated with the incumbent and, therefore, vulnerable. Does ethnic stacking in 
armed forces actually work? In particular, does it help regimes keep their armies loyal in 
the face of uprisings from below? 
To provide the first large-N answer to this question, this research note examines 
the relationship between ethnic stacking and defection in a set of all fifty-seven uprisings 
from below in Africa since independence identified by the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011). We find, consistent with ethnic stacking theory, that ethnic stacking 
leads to more defections when the regime implements it in the face of a dominant group 
in the officer corps that it seeks to marginalize. This is the downside risk of ethnic 
stacking. However, we find only limited evidence for the supposed upside of ethnic 
stacking for a regime. Specifically, regimes that successfully put an ethnic in-group in a 
dominant position in the officer corps appear, overall, no less likely to experience 
defection than those that do not employ ethnic stacking at all.  
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However, we do find potential evidence for a temporally bounded approach to 
ethnic stacking. Stacking appears to prevent defection provided a regime has not recently 
experienced a coup attempt. We suggest that this may be because it takes time for ethnic 
stacking to push expectations about behavior to converge along certain identity lines; in 
regimes with recent coup attempts, it is possible that this has not yet occurred. Regimes 
would thus have to survive a potential period of instability to reap the loyalty benefits of 
ethnic stacking.  
Ethnic stacking: theory and empirical expectations 
We define ethnic stacking as the practice of recruiting and promoting members of 
certain communal groups seen as more loyal, called in-groups, within the security forces; 
this favoritism harms communal groups seen as less loyal, called out-groups. Ethnic 
stacking therefore involves promoting groups seen as likely to be loyal to positions where 
loyalty matters most: senior officer positions (Singh 2014); command of military units 
that will be tasked with protecting the capital (De Bruin 2018); and internal security and 
intelligence. This policy limits out-group officers’ careers and typically puts them under 
greater surveillance and suspicion (Bou Nassif 2015).  
We term these ethnic stacking policies “incomplete” when only selected positions 
within the security forces are stacked with in-group members and a majority of officers 
come from out-groups. In contrast, ethnic stacking is “complete” when it overhauls the 
composition of the officer corps and in-group members come to represent a majority of 
officers. We elaborate this distinction below. 
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 The logic of ethnic stacking arises from the problem of military disloyalty. It 
examines in particular how identity intersects with the problem of knowing who is loyal 
and who is not. During coup attempts and uprisings from below, political leaders face a 
problem of information about the motivations of their security personnel (McLauchlin 
2010); they are unsure who among them will be especially inclined to defect. Military 
personnel, after all, have good reason to hide their preferences. Notably, the decision of 
whether to support or oppose the regime, in both coups and uprisings, resembles a 
coordination game (Kuran 1991; Powell 2012; Singh 2014; Casper and Tyson 2014; 
Talmadge 2015; Sudduth 2017b). Officers seek to be on the winning side, for the sake 
both of one’s own career (and life) and of preserving military unity. So they often hide 
their true preferences, going along with a winning side until another looks like it is likely 
to win.  
However, these are not pure coordination games, in which all officers care about 
is being on the winning side. Different officers favor the victory of one side or another of 
a coup attempt or uprising, and thus vary widely in how likely it is that they will rebel 
(Kuran 1991; La Parra-Pérez 2014; Singh 2014, 63).  Nevertheless, they still have strong 
reason to keep this true preference a secret and “go with the flow.” In sum, officers vary 
in their preferences about the regime and may be more or less likely to join an effort to 
topple it, but it is hard to find out what their preferences are because of their fear of 
reprisals.  
Hence a critical aspect of how regimes protect themselves is by assessing loyalties 
through internal surveillance and recent disloyal behavior. This helps them to determine 
who is likely to participate and to pre-empt (Brooks 1998; Quinlivan 1999; Sudduth 
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2017a). De Bruin (2018) goes farther, arguing that divisions in the armed forces protect a 
regime above all by creating an interest in defending the regime. Notably, as de Bruin 
argues, leaders set up elite protection forces whose members will fear purges after 
successful coups and thus be especially inclined to oppose those coups. In sum, regimes 
have strong incentives to try to both detect disloyal preferences and to create them 
endogenously. 
Both of these mechanisms underlie ethnic stacking, as McLauchlin (2010) 
theorizes. That is, identity works both as a source of information and a way of 
crystallizing competing interests. Leaders look to ethnic identity as a proxy for loyalties, 
based on an “ethnic security map” (Enloe 1980, 27) that suggests to a leader which 
groups are more loyal and which less. But at the same time, ethnic stacking policies 
create self-fulfilling prophecies. Ethnicity becomes an indicator of loyalties not just in the 
eyes of the political leader that puts ethnic stacking in place, but in the eyes of the public 
at large as well. It becomes easy to see any Alawite officer as a regime loyalist in Syria, 
for example. Alawite officers, in turn, fear that their identity marks them out as loyalists, 
to be purged after a successful coup plot or victorious uprising. In short, in-group officers 
fear that, however they act during a coup or uprising, they may be removed from their 
posts or killed. Officers who have been recruited and promoted due to their communal 
ties with leaders must “sink or swim” with the incumbent government (Bratton and van 
de Walle 1994, 464). They are thus in what McLauchlin (2018) calls a “loyalty trap”: in-
group members are loyal to the regime in part because everyone expects them to be loyal, 
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and so in-group members expect the opposition to discriminate against them (see also 
Chandra 2004, 2006; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008).
1
  
The same logic applies to out-group members, albeit in reverse. Members of a 
marginalized group in the officer corps will know that their identity marks them out for 
suspicion and limits their career chances. Out-group members should thus be more 
motivated to defect under ethnic stacking, even as in-group members are less likely to. 
Hence, as we explore below, the net effect on overall defection should thus depend on the 
relative presence and position of in-group and out-group members—or, in other words, 
on how completely ethnic stacking is applied. 
 In short, ethnic stacking theory argues that while a regime may fear out-group 
disloyalty to begin with, and have more confidence in in-group members, the policy of 
ethnic stacking reinforces these tendencies by publicly associating group members with 
the regime. Stacking should have an exogenous impact on the propensity to defect, going 
beyond the initial distribution of loyalties along ethnic lines. 
No study thus far conducts a large cross-national test of the stacking logic in the 
context of uprisings. Large-N analyses of coup attempts in Africa do find that these 
attempts are less likely in countries where the leader’s group successfully dominates the 
officer corps (Harkness 2016) or the executive more generally (Roessler 2011).  
In contrast to coups, we focus here on mass defection in the context of uprisings 
from below. But mass defection in this context above all occurs when the rank and file 
                                                          
1
 This analysis suggests that there is not much inherent to ethnicity that makes it work 
where other labels of loyalties, like class or membership in a particular elite military unit, 
would not; but it is a particularly widespread set of markers. 
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switch sides. Therefore, one important question is whether there is a connection between 
stacking in the officer corps and ordinary soldiers’ behavior. We believe there is. 
Commanding officers are in a position to push all their subordinates to defect with them 
by using their power to order them (Harkness 2016, 592; Albrecht and Ohl 2016, 45-47). 
More senior officers can use communication channels they regularly use and their 
military standing to lobby for their subordinates within multiple units to defect (Harkness 
2016, 592; Singh 2014, 35-36). While the rank and file can still defect without officers, 
this is hard: officers often keep a close watch on their soldiers and ensure compliance, so 
ordinary soldiers must often wait for surveillance breakdowns before trying to defect 
(Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht 2016, 47-48). Ethnic stacking in the officer corps thus 
should help the regime to prevent mass defection down the chain of command. Putting 
in-group officers in senior positions means that far fewer orders to defect are issued to 
subordinates. When junior in-group officers are ordered to defect, they are likely to 
refuse and to prevent such orders from being passed to their own subordinates. What 
seems to apply to officers in coups may also therefore apply to ordinary soldiers and 
uprisings from below. 
Indeed, case study research from Africa and the Middle East seems to confirm 
this. Ethnic stacking has kept members of in-groups loyal in the face of some important 
uprisings from below, while possibly making out-group officers more inclined to defect 
(McLauchlin 2010; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2013; Bou Nassif 2015; Morency-Laflamme 
2016; Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht 2016; though on the Arab Spring, see also Koehler 
2017). These findings about popular uprisings in comparative case-study research have 
yet to receive large-N confirmation. Do the findings travel and generalize?  
8 
 
We should note that our empirical analysis encompasses both violent and 
nonviolent uprisings. Is this an appropriate scope condition? True, the (initially) 
nonviolent cases of the Arab-world uprisings of 2011 loom large in the ethnic stacking 
literature (Brooks 2019). However, existing analyses of defection patterns in Syria that 
consider the civil war period and find little differences between that time and the period 
of nonviolent uprising. If anything, the identity effect seems stronger in wartime (Bou 
Nassif 2015; Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht 2016). Further, other cases that motivate 
stacking theory are violent; for example, McLauchlin (2010) includes two cases (Jordan, 
1970; Iran, 1978-79) that some datasets (Fearon and Laitin 2003) consider violent enough 
to count as civil conflicts (Iran is debatable here; Jordan is not). Large-N analyses also 
find that ethnic exclusivity in access to executive power is associated with long civil wars 
as both sides, and notably the regime, harden with respect to identity shifts 
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; McLauchlin 2018). There are therefore good reasons to 
expect that the key hypotheses of ethnic stacking theory should apply to both. Still, we 
investigate the difference between violent and nonviolent contexts in a supplemental file 
and find little effect on the efficacy of stacking. 
 For this study, we derive broad hypotheses that focus on explaining the incidence 
of mass defection across the whole army. This overall portrait of defection—rather than 
the behavior of members of particular groups—matters for the outcomes of uprisings 
(Russell 1974; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Hence, analyzing whether mass defection 
occurs gives a good first cut at a politically important phenomenon.  
The net effect of ethnic stacking on the overall rate of defection depends on how 
far the stacking policy goes. Out-group members may still have quite a large presence, 
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and the seniority to be able to defect with large numbers of subordinates. This was the 
case in Benin, where only senior positions and the presidential guard were stacked with 
Northerners; southerners, particularly Fons, still represent more than half of the officer 
corps (Allen 1992, 44). A leader may be in the process of promoting his allies and 
purging his adversaries, but this takes time and care since out-group members are losing 
their position and have incentives to resist, including by launching a coup or rebelling 
before they are too weak to do so (Sudduth 2017a, 2017b). During this process, as long as 
out-group members still outnumber in-group members in the officer corps (we call this 
“incomplete ethnic stacking”), rebellions from below pose considerable dangers for a 
regime. Out-group officers may take advantage of rebellions from below to defect.  
In contrast, a leader employing ethnic stacking could essentially eliminate the 
downside disloyalty risk when in-group officers dominate the officer corps numerically 
(“complete ethnic stacking”). In Zaire/DRC, for instance, President Mobutu almost 
completely stacked the officer corps with officers from his native Equateur region; 
officers from this group represented close to 80 percent of the officer corps by the end of 
Mobutu’s rule (Emizet 2000, 216). Out-group members might form only a small share of 
an army, or only in subordinate and easily controlled positions. They may therefore have 
little opportunity to defect, and their defection may not move the overall rate much. This 
key distinction therefore leads to two separate hypotheses: 
H1. Incomplete ethnic stacking should be associated with a higher incidence of 
defection, relative to contexts characterized by either (a) a lack of stacking or (b) 
complete ethnic stacking. 
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H2. Complete ethnic stacking should be associated with a lower incidence of 
defection, relative to conditions that lack ethnic stacking. 
It is possible that other variables could influence how stacking affects defection. Violent 
uprisings by challengers who explicitly mobilize out-group grievances might be 
especially likely to prompt in-group members to stick with the regime out of fear. 
Alternatively, it may be that they rally regardless of how the opposition behaves because 
they regard opposition claims to pluralism and nonviolence as not credible (McLauchlin 
2018). While we are not able to analyze the impact of ethnic claims for this research note 
because of data limitations, we do analyze the impact of violent rebellions and find little 
change in our results. The complete analysis is available in a supplemental file.  
Empirical analysis 
 In this research note, we study the impact of ethnic stacking on defection in fifty-
seven NAVCO uprisings in Africa since political independence (or since 1945, in the 
cases of Liberia and Ethiopia). In doing so, we study a region where ethnic stacking 
theory has received support in case-study research (Morency-Laflamme 2018) and where 
consonant hypotheses for coups have found support (Roessler 2011; Harkness 2016). In 
geographical terms, then, this is an easy test for ethnic stacking theory.  
The dependent variable is NAVCO 1.1’s binary measure of defection, which takes 
a value of 1 if there are “large-scale, systematic breakdowns on the execution of orders 
from the target regime” (Chenoweth 2011, 34). NAVCO 1.1 measures its variable in the 
“peak year” of a campaign. We updated some codings in line with NAVCO 2.0 and 
conducted a systematic review of the remaining codings, changing two in particular; 
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details of these changes are available in the supplementary file. The dependent variable 
refers to mass defection and thus indicates above all the behavior of the rank and file. 
However, as we argue above, officers’ actions can shape defection among the rank and 
file. Ethnic stacking theory therefore expects there to be a link between this variable and 
stacking in the officer corps: an officer corps with complete ethnic stacking should be 
able to avoid mass breakdowns in the face of uprisings from below. It is true that ethnic 
stacking theory also expects stacking to have effects that would not be detected by the 
NAVCO measure of defection. For example, ethnic stacking might help a regime survive 
in spite of mass defection, by reinforcing a loyal core in the face of widespread defection 
among out-group members (McLauchlin 2018). Such is the case in Syria. But at an 
aggregate level, if stacking reinforces in-group loyalty and in-group members are 
especially dominant in the officer corps, we contend that the likelihood of such mass 
defection in the first place should decline. 
 We rely on previous work, particularly Harkness (2016), to code our independent 
variables. Harkness (2016) codes whether the first post-independence government 
adopted an ethnic stacking policy in the armed forces and, if so, whether this was an in-
group that was already dominant (hence, complete ethnic stacking) or not (hence, 
incomplete ethnic stacking). For any uprising in the first year after independence, we 
simply used Harkness’ coding of ethnic stacking in the first post-independence 
government. However, we reviewed all of Harkness’ codes, changed one of them that did 
not match our findings, and added a missing code; details are in the supplementary file. 
We then extend Harkness’ data forward in time, based on a reading of secondary material 
about each case. We thus produce a first code for whether a government used ethnic 
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stacking or not. If it did, we produce a second code measuring whether this stacking 
policy matched the existing makeup of the officer corps. If a majority of officers were 
from in-groups, we code the case as complete ethnic stacking; if not, we code it as 
incomplete. We measure these variables at the outset of each case of an uprising in Africa 
in the NAVCO dataset since independence.  
Results 











Mass defection 3 (23%) 7 (23%) 7 (54%) 
No mass defection 10 (77%) 24 (77%) 6 (46%) 
Total 13 (100%) 31 (100%) 13 (100%) 
Chi-square: 4.64, p <.1  
Statistical significance, t-tests: (1) vs. (2): n.s. 
(1) vs. (3): p < .05 
(2) vs. (3): p < .05 
 
 In this study, we use cross-tabs in order to discuss the results in some detail, and 
to avoid the inference problems created by a low N (for logit analysis) and a binary 
dependent variable (for linear regression); in the supplemental file we use a regression 
framework that confirms our key results.  
We begin with the bivariate relationship between ethnic stacking and defection in 
Table 1. At first glance, things do not look great for ethnic stacking as a policy. It clearly 
has a downside risk: consistent with H1, incomplete ethnic stacking comes with a higher 
risk of defection than either no stacking or complete stacking (p <.05). But the data do 
not permit the conclusion that it has an upside at the aggregate level (H2): there is no 
difference in the incidence of mass defection between cases of complete ethnic stacking 
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and no stacking at all. In further analyses, available in a supplementary file, we find that 
this null result cannot be explained away either by armies in which there is still a 
substantial presence of out-group officers despite in-group dominance; out-group 
presence in the rank and file rather than the officer corps; or a selection effect in which 
personalist regimes are likely both to employ ethnic stacking and to have relatively high 
defection rates (Dahl 2015). 
 
Table 2. Frequency of mass defection during uprisings, by ethnic stacking and 












attempt in last 
ten years 
Mass defection 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 2 (40%) 
No mass defection 7 (78%) 14 (100%) 3 (60%) 
Total 9 (100%) 14 (100%) 5 (100%) 
 Chi-square: 5.50, p <.1    
 Statistical significance, t-tests: (1) vs. (2): p < .05 
(1) vs. (3): n.s. 
(2) vs. (3): p < .05 
  
   
Coup attempt 
in last ten 
years 
Mass defection 1 (25%) 7 (41%) 5 (63%) 
No mass defection 3 (75%) 10 (59%) 3 (38%) 
Total 4 (100%) 17 (100%) 8 (100%) 
 
Chi-square: 1.74, n.s. 
Statistical significance, t-tests: all n.s. 
 
Note: some columns do not total 100% due to rounding. 
 
However, the null result may have to do with civil-military instability. Recall that 
ethnic stacking is, in theory, about creating stable expectations in an environment in 
which it is difficult to know officers’ intentions. Recent coup attempts indicate an 
especially unstable, uncertain environment. Given a recent coup attempt, it is plausible 
that ethnic stacking would not have had the time to entrench stable expectations of 
behavior. In Table 2, therefore, we interact the ethnic stacking variable with a dummy 
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variable indicating whether there has been a coup attempt in the ten years prior to the 
start of the uprising (based on Marshall and Marshall 2011). In the fourteen cases of 
uprisings in a regime with complete ethnic stacking and no recent history of coup 
attempts, mass defection never occurred. With a previous coup attempt, mass defection 
occurred over 40 percent of the time. In addition to the results shown in the table, this 
difference is statistically significant (p <.01). In contrast, regimes that did not employ 
ethnic stacking experienced defection some of the time, even without recent coup 
attempts. The result hints at a conditional relationship: ethnic stacking may help prevent 
defection but only when combined with stable civil-military relations. With recent coups, 
it may not help at all. 
In line with ethnic stacking theory, one obvious interpretation of this result is that 
it simply reflects the presence of members of marginalized ethnic out-groups, who both 
launch coup attempts and defect. However, we think this explanation is insufficient. As 
we show in the supplementary files, given a numerically dominant in-group (i.e. a case of 
complete ethnic stacking), defection appears to be unrelated to the significant presence or 
absence of marginalized out-groups.  
Another possibility is that the finding reflects different institutional conditions, 
such as personalist regimes versus more institutionalized rule. Personalist regimes, with 
their unstable coalitions of competing factions, might experience both more coup 
attempts and greater military defection (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Dahl 2015). 
They may also be less able to stably implement ethnic stacking. We test this possibility in 
the supplemental file, but the coups pattern we observe in Table 2 does not reappear 
when we break down results by regime type. In other words, it seems that the actual 
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incidence of coup attempts, and not institutional features, drive defection during 
uprisings. 
We believe that a better explanation of this result is that a history of recent coup 
attempts suggests above all that expectations about loyalties are not stable—a critical 
component of ethnic stacking. One reason would be that coup attempts undermine the 
expectation that in-group members are loyal to the regime. After all, it is well established 
that coup attempts lead to more coup attempts. A victorious coup gives an example for 
subsequent coup plotters. Hence, circumstances of turbulent civil-military relations may 
often present opportunities to fairly easily organize factions dividing in-groups. Such 
dynamics appear in the “coups of ethnic narrowing” that described Idi Amin’s Uganda, 
which reduce the self-reinforcing solidarity of ethnic stacking (Horowitz 2000, 487-92). 
In our dataset, coup attempts do in fact sometimes reveal fractures within in-groups, as in 
intra-Northern coup attempts in Nigeria in 1985 and 1986 or Sudan in 1975 and 1976 
(Ihonvbere 1991, 609-10; Horowitz 2000, 485). These divisions ultimately played a role 
in defection during uprisings against the regimes in these countries beginning in 1993 (in 
Nigeria) and 1985 (in Sudan). Ethnic stacking may therefore require that significant time 
elapse after a coup attempt before solidifying. For example, despite several coups 
between 1963 and 1967, Togo’s ethnic stacking policy finally paid off for the Gnassingbé 
Éyadéma regime in the face of the pro-democracy uprising of 1990-93, as the army held 
firm (Morency-Laflamme 2016, ch 5). 
A second mechanism relating to unstable expectations is that coup attempts may 
reflect changes in regime or in policy that give out-group members a limited window of 
opportunity to act before they are too marginalized and subordinated within the military 
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hierarchy to do much. In our dataset, a history of coup attempts often indicates new 
regimes (some, obviously, are installed by the coup in question, like Samuel Doe in 
Liberia in 1980; others are able to gain power in part because of a coup-weakened 
incumbent, as in Milton Obote’s regaining of power in Uganda in 1979-80; see 
Rwengabo 2013, 539; Horowitz 2000, 487-92). Coups also often correspond to new 
regime strategies, whether as cause or effect. For example, the marginalization of 
Southern officers in Sudan provoked both a coup attempt in 1977 and large-scale 
defection in 1983, while coup attempts in Liberia in 1985 and in Sierra Leone in 1987 
prompted the further marginalization of former in-groups – whether associated with the 
coup attempt or not – as fearful regimes narrowed their bases of support (Horowitz 2000, 
485; D. H. Johnson 2007, 62-63; Kandeh 1992, 93, 1999, 362-63; Roessler 2011, 314). 
Opposition campaigns in each of these countries thus occurred at a propitious moment for 
marginalized groups in the military. 
There is thus a hint here of an upside to ethnic stacking for a regime when it 
comes to preventing defection during uprisings, if those regimes are able to avoid coup 
attempts and stabilize expectations about behavior over time. However, in order to really 
test the notion of convergence of expectations over time, we would need to put stacking 
into historical perspective, analyzing how long a stacking policy had been put in place, 
and—if a regime does experience coup attempts in the recent past—the other tools at its 
disposal to survive long enough for ethnic stacking to solidify. This is an important next 




 This study thus provides tentative results for ethnic stacking’s effects on military 
defection in the face of uprisings across Africa since independence. The analysis clearly 
demonstrates the downside risk of establishing ethnic stacking in the face of another 
group that is numerically dominant in the officer corps. However, evidence in support of 
the upside of ethnic stacking for a regime is more limited. There is no overall evidence 
for a lower incidence of mass defection when a regime makes an in-group dominant, than 
when it does not employ ethnic stacking at all. An intriguing pattern that emerges, 
however, is that stacking does seem to prevent defection in regimes with no recent coup 
history. It is possible that this shows that ethnic stacking requires a period of military 
stability to solidify, although historical analysis would be important to verify this.  
 The most important next step for large-N analyses of stacking and defection is to 
gather time-variant data on stacking policies, not just observing them at key moments like 
regime crises. This would permit a fuller analysis both of the selection process of ethnic 
stacking and of the historical character of its implementation. Disaggregated data 
breaking down defection behavior by members of different ethnic groups would permit a 
more detailed test of the key hypotheses of ethnic stacking theory. 
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